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Abstract 
For decades, courtrooms around the world have admitted evidence from forensic 
science analysts, such as fingerprint, tool-mark and bite-mark examiners, in order to 
solve crimes. Scientific progress, however, has led to significant criticism of the 
ability of such disciplines to engage in individualization i.e., “match” suspects 
exclusively to evidence. Despite this, American courts largely reject legal challenges 
based on arguments that identification evidence provided by these forensic science 
disciplines is unreliable. In so holding, these courts affirm precedent that it is the 
adversarial system’s function to weed out frailties in forensic evidence, and find that 
criticism of the forensic sciences lacks sui generis qualities. This article provides an 
independent critique of relevant American case law, from which three themes 
emerge. These themes are (1) the law’s misuse of science; (2) law’s scepticism 
towards change; and (3) law’s narrow construction of rationality, which generates 
reductionist concepts, and divorces science from its social context. As such, this 
article shows how the American judiciary’s approach to this global issue provides a 
contemporary illustration of key institutional tensions between science and law, and 
offers some recommendations for reforms that aim to facilitate the legal process to 
utilize the most reliable forensic science evidence possible. 
 
Introduction 
Science and law are powerful social institutions that enjoy “great epistemic 
legitimacy and authority.”1 One area of society in which these two institutions 
intersect, and, indeed, compete for epistemic legitimacy, is the criminal justice 
process. This is particularly the case when the criminal justice process ‘uses’ science 
to answer forensic questions and help solve crime.  
Crime-solving can involve the application of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ science. Hard 
science refers to natural or physical sciences, such as chemistry, biology, 
mathematics, and physics. These sciences investigate the universe by means of 
hypotheses and experiments where precise measurement, calculation and prediction 
can generally occur.2  In a crime-solving sense, hard science can tell us, for 
example, whether a driver has alcohol in his blood through toxicology testing, and, 
through the application of DNA technology, whether a suspect is the donor of a DNA 
profile found on an assault victim.  By contrast, the soft sciences comprise 
disciplines that interpret human behaviour, institutions and society on the basis of 
investigations for which it can be difficult to establish such levels of precision.3 Soft 
sciences (also known as social sciences) include psychology, sociology and 
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anthropology. These disciplines can also inform crime solving. For instance, 
psychologists might testify about the validity of memories.  
It is generally accepted that hard science methodologies produce results that have 
greater levels of cumulative certainty. Yet, disciplines in both categories can involve 
varying levels of accepted reliability.4 Moreover, both categories, at times, have 
‘housed’ a now discredited theory.5 In fact, both hard and soft science will likely 
continue to include what end up as defunct theories, such is the progressive nature 
of science.  
Alongside the application of traditional hard and soft science disciplines to aid the 
solving of crime are a vast array of forensic science identification techniques. These 
techniques include fingerprint, tool-mark, bite-mark, microscopic hair and shoe and 
tyre print analysis. These disciplines do not fall neatly into either category. They lack 
the so-called “predictive power” or cumulative certainty associated with hard 
sciences, as they have generally not been subject to precise and extensive 
experimentation.6 Although, notably, there is scope to develop robust experimental 
frameworks in these disciplines,7 and some efforts have been – and continue to be - 
made.8 Sometimes these disciplines are referred to as “soft sciences”,9 particularly 
by the courts. This label is often resented by people working in these fields, however. 
This is because the “soft” label suggests that these disciplines involve an inferior 
scientific methodology, in comparison to that employed by “hard” science disciplines. 
Still, there is no official conclusion that this is (or should be) a definitive 
categorisation. 
The difficulty involved in classifying these disciplines relates to the fact that they 
have been “invented by and for police departments.”10 For decades examiners (who 
are mostly based in law enforcement departments) have claimed that, through 
analysis and comparison techniques,11 they are able to match a suspect, with 
certainty, to evidence located at crime scenes and on crime victims.12 The practice of 
“matching” a suspect exclusively to evidence is termed “individualization.”13 These 
conclusions, however, lack scientific validation.14  
Despite this, the criminal justice process routinely presents the methodologies of 
these disciplines as ‘scientific’, and the products of them as ‘scientific knowledge’. 
America’s adversarial system has embraced this type of evidence as having great 
levels of scientific validity, certainty and reliability. Judges have admitted evidence 
from a wide variety of forensic techniques and experts;15 lawyers have shaped 
prosecution and defence narratives in accordance with examiners’ findings; and 
jurors have developed a thirst for the alleged certainty provided by such methods.16 
Such evidence has filtered, with relative ease, into the rational processes employed 
in America for identifying the perpetrators of crimes.17 Forensic identification 
evidence of this kind aids the American criminal justice system in generating 
legitimate convictions that can survive the post-conviction relief appeals process 
and, thus, engender trust and stability in the law. 
However, scientific progress over the last three decades has challenged the certainty 
of conclusions made by examiners in these disciplines. Since the 1980s, DNA 
technology has shone a uniquely critical light on the ability of numerous forensic 
sciences to engage in reliable individualization. Rigorous testing has led to DNA 
analysts being able to obtain a profile from cellular material left at crime scenes and 
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on victims and establish, with certainty and consistency, that only one person [i.e., a 
suspect] could have been the source of the specimen material.18 DNA evidence is, 
thus, the most reliable approximation of individualization evidence that the scientific 
method can currently offer. By contrast, the forensic science methods servicing the 
criminal justice system, do not (yet) have the same scientific underpinnings for their 
claims of individualization. The National Academy of Sciences confirmed this in their 
landmark 2009 report — Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A 
Path Forward (“NRC Report”). The report concluded, “[w]ith the exception of nuclear 
DNA analysis ... no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity 
to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection 
between evidence and a specific individual or source.”19  
DNA technology has exposed wrongful convictions worldwide and simultaneously 
revealed that erroneous forensic science evidence has contributed to the conviction 
of the innocent.20 In light of this, how law responds to the uncertainty generated by 
progressing science in this context is an issue of global significance. The American 
criminal justice system’s engagement with this issue, however, provides a 
particularly compelling illustration of how this intersection of the legal process with 
scientific uncertainty reflects institutional tensions between law and science. There 
have been over 330 post-conviction DNA exonerations in America, 47% of which are 
attributable to unreliable forensic science evidence.21 These cases have sparked a 
nation-wide “revolution”, known as the American Innocence Movement, which 
umbrellas a multitude of ‘innocentric’ initiatives.22 They have also prompted 
Congress,23 the revered National Academy of Sciences,24 and the United States 
Supreme Court to acknowledge that these identification methods suffer from 
significant deficiencies.25 
Despite this, American courts largely reject legal challenges based on arguments 
that identification evidence provided by forensic science disciplines is unreliable. 
Whether a petitioner’s claim is couched in terms of a challenge to the admissibility of 
such evidence, or shaped as an argument that criticism of the methodologies 
represents a shift in scientific opinion that qualifies as newly discovered evidence, 
the courts generally uphold the admission of such evidence, and reject that it 
satisfies newly discovered evidence thresholds.  
This article offers an independent critique of this body of case law, and through that 
critique shows how it illustrates institutional tensions between law and science. Part I 
sets out the general institutional differences between law and science. Using 
examples from the American courts’ engagement with challenges to the reliability of 
forensic science identification evidence, Part II demonstrates how three thematic 
tensions between law and science emerge from this body of case law. These themes 
are (a) law’s misuse of science; (b) law’s scepticism about change; and (c) law’s 
narrow construction of rationality. Part III suggests a number of reforms, which aim to 
facilitate the legal process to utilize the most reliable forensic science evidence 
possible. These reforms are: calling for the law to be more open-minded about 
change in the light of progressing science; the development of forensic science 
commissions that allow for multi-stakeholder collaboration to improve the use of 
forensic science in the criminal justice process; increased training for relevant social 
actors, including lawyers, judges, law enforcement and jurors; focused lawyering 
strategies that seek to address judicial concerns about challenges to forensics 
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science evidence; and, when it comes to making use of reliable scientific evidence, a 
more proactive harnessing of the institutional strengths of the courts by judges. Part 
IV concludes that the law must, in order to overcome the imaginative difficulties 
associated with being on the cusp of this paradigm shift, meaningfully acknowledge 
that these tensions exist. 
 
Part I: The Institutional Differences Between Law and Science 
The institutions of law and science approach the world in different ways. Faigman 
summarises that  
Science progresses while law builds slowly on precedent. Science assumes 
that humankind is determined by some combination of nature and nurture, 
while law assumes that humankind can transcend these influences and 
exercise free will. Science is a cooperative endeavour, while most legal 
institutions operate on an adversary model.26 
A deconstruction of Faigman’s summary is helpful in understanding how tension is 
generated between law and science in the context of the criminal justice process and 
forensic science. First, the progression of science versus the precedent-sensitive 
nature of, in particular, common law jurisdictions like America, impacts how both 
institutions view and respond to change. The term ‘science’ refers to a particular kind 
of knowledge that “reflects the privilege accorded to the fruits of the scientific 
method…”27 The modern scientific method can fairly be described as “a mode of 
investigation characterized by cycles of systematic empirical observation and 
hypothesis formation.”28 Like law, the scientific method values precedent in that it 
employs controlled experiments and standardized procedures in order to test both 
previous and new hypotheses.29  
A key difference, however, is that the products of the scientific method are widely 
understood to be provisional: hypotheses are routinely revised or abandoned and 
replaced by new dominant theories.30 This methodology “motivates more and more 
scientific study, and is thus vital to the scientific enterprise.”31 Hence, science 
embraces change in order to prevent the entrenchment of dogma or, more 
colloquially, ‘junk science.’32 Conversely, just as science is sceptical of the possibility 
of complete knowledge, law is sceptical about change. This is largely because law is 
loyal to ideals associated with the legal process vision, such as finality, predictability 
and procedural regularity, which help it to maintain social order. Thus, science might 
have progressed beyond the idea that many forensic sciences can engage in 
individualization with certainty, but the law continues to apply (sometimes century 
old) precedents that allow the admission of ‘junk science’ into courtrooms.  
Second, Faigman makes reference to the social context of law and science. Both 
institutions are social enterprises; however the filtering of science through the legal 
process can have the effect of divorcing science from its social context. Evidence of 
fingerprints, tool-marks, and bite-marks, for example, “cannot definitively incriminate 
a defendant without the aid of a complex social infrastructure to make them visible 
and interpretable in a court of law.”33 The legal process, however, can distort ideas of 
what it means to be scientific and objective, as it can stifle the reality that science is 
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a social achievement. Law does not necessarily endorse the view that products of 
the scientific method are routinely formed via a social consensus on a set of facts.  
Neither does the law, in its application of science, adhere to the accepted view in the 
scientific community that science is not ‘value neutral’, either in the selection of 
problems it investigates or in its application, as there is “always a normative choice 
underlying … what to control and why.”34 The presence of these “value motivations 
… calls for special caution in judging how well the process generating the asserted 
scientific knowledge has lived up to the ideals of science practice.”35 The legal 
process, however, is not necessarily cautious, as its filtering processes can result in 
scientific evidence being “viewed as no longer bearing traces of human 
subjectivity.”36 Consequently, social actors in the criminal process can demonstrate a 
relative willingness to place trust in science and technology because it appears to 
“take the establishment of the truth away from fallible human beings…”37 Rather, the 
legal process promulgates the idea that science lodges ‘truth’ in impersonal agents, 
such as forensic science identification techniques and DNA analysis technologies. 
This process has become invested with the hope of providing “unbiased and reliable 
evidence about the facts of the matter.”38 However, as Jasanoff has warned, “Human 
actions...can never be entirely ruled out of the picture in the production of 
evidence.”39 Science simply isn’t possible without human participation.  
Third, Faigman references the general methodologies employed by the institutions of 
law and science. On the one hand, science employs a largely cooperative 
methodology. Scientists are collaborative actors; the perspectives of their peers are 
fundamental to their practice. A scientist considers how their peers, mentors, 
colleagues and those who review their scholarship would evaluate their research.40 
The institution of science enables the organized pooling of limited understandings, 
the sharing of perspectives, and testing of correspondence by collective insights.41  
This is in stark contrast to the methodology employed by the law in adversarial 
systems of justice, like America. The adversarial model forces the parties to take 
opposing stances, and, thus, can prevent a full consideration of scientific issues. 
This model encourages the parties to “produce evidence favourable to their 
respective sides, regardless of the quality of that science.”42 This process can often 
polarize the scientific evidence at issue and rely on marginal experts, who are willing 
to be more certain in their conclusions, despite a lack of scientific evidence for those 
conclusions.43 This means that the process ultimately fails to provide a full spectrum 
of evidence, about the science at issue, to the court. Evidence that reaches the court 
does not represent the relevant scientific field more generally; resulting in the court 
hearing “highly practiced alternative stories that only roughly approximate what might 
be termed reality.”44 In light of this, cross-examination techniques are crucial to the 
adversarial process. Cross-examination can have varied outcomes, however. It can 
serve to strengthen the reliability of sound forensic techniques by putting pressure on 
them, but also seduce juries into favouring unsound evidence because the witness 
has either being poorly examined or is a persuasive witness. Cross-examination can 
also result in the dismissal of sound scientific evidence from the courtroom, 
particularly if it is designed to subject reputable witnesses to ridicule and/or personal 
attack.45  
These institutional differences can have a significant impact when science enters the 
criminal justice process as evidence, where, through the testimony of expert 
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witnesses, science must speak to law.46 As Jasanoff explains, “The use of scientific 
evidence…in court…brings into collaboration two institutions with significantly 
different aims and normative commitments.”47 This is not a friction-free encounter as 
neither science nor law completely retains or completely relinquishes its autonomy.48 
Law must provide “coherence and ultimate resolution to the varied voices of scientific 
administration.”49 However, in doing so, legal frameworks prevent the varied and 
discrete operations of scientific administration from being brought into corrosive 
comparison with each other, as such a comparison would reveal their “uncertain and 
overlapping bounds and challenge their claims to autonomy.”50  Thus, forensic 
science serving the law cannot “proceed in quite the same ways as science done 
purely to advance the cause of science.”51 An examination of judicial responses to 
challenges to the reliability of forensic science identification evidence confirms the 
existence of these tensions. Part II examines this body of case law. 
 
Part II: Tensions Between Law and Science: Emerging Themes From the Case 
Law  
Using examples from the courts’ engagement with challenges to the reliability of 
forensic science identification evidence, Part II demonstrates how the courts 
exemplify three thematic tensions between the institutions of law and science. These 
themes are (a) the law’s misuse of science; (b) the law’s scepticism about change; 
and (c) the law’s narrow construction of rationality.  
A. Law’s ‘(Mis)Use’ of Science 
Science – whether it be in the form of fingerprints, bite-marks, or tool-marks - enters 
the criminal justice process as ‘evidence,’52 not as “bare facts or claimed truths about 
the world.”53 It is not presented in a neutral form because the adversarial system 
forces it to ‘pick a side:’ scientific evidence is either presented in favour of the 
prosecution or the defense narrative. In order to be part of either narrative, “science 
must be worked into the particular kinds of propositions, representations, or material 
objects that the law regards as germane to establishing which party is telling the 
more plausible story.”54 More specifically, in America, scientific evidence must satisfy 
admissibility frameworks, such as the Daubert55admissibility criteria (which operates 
at the federal level),and newly discovered evidence rules, which are designed to filter 
evidence to suit the epistemological needs of the law. 
Law expects scientific evidence that survives this filtering process to be an objective 
‘cure’ that provides certain answers to questions such as “who did the crime?” The 
cases of Brooks v. State56 and State v. Stubbs57 show how this process can force 
objectivity and reliability out of ‘science’ to the detriment of substantive accuracy. It 
also illustrates how marginal experts can influence litigation. 
In Brooks, the petitioner had been convicted of capital murder based, in part, on the 
testimony of Dr. Michael West, who testified that two dentations present on the 
victim’s body had been made by Brooks. Brooks claimed that his trial court erred in 
admitting West’s testimony because he was not an expert in forensic odontology. In 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi, despite concerns about Dr. West58 and the fact 
other experts found inconsistencies between the bite-mark and Brooks’ teeth,59 the 
majority took the chance to “state affirmatively that bite mark identification evidence 
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is admissible in Mississippi.”60 The court followed precedent, stating that because 
Brooks had the opportunity to present his own experts,61 and “to attack the 
qualifications of the expert, the methods and data used to compare the bite marks to 
persons other than the defendant, and the factual and logical bases of the expert’s 
opinions”62 his conviction was legitimate.  
The dissent had reservations, however, about Dr. West’s alleged “unmatched ability 
to conclude that no one other than the defendant could have produced the marks on 
the deceased…”63 The dissent had concerns about the reliability of bite-mark 
individualization evidence,64 the sore divide between expert opinions,65 and “West’s 
propensity for testifying with a confidence seen in no other expert.”66 Justice McRae 
detailed many concerns about West, including that he had materially misrepresented 
evidence and data, used methods not founded on scientific principles and claimed to 
have expertise in a vast array of identification disciplines.67 Justice McRae concluded 
that the majority’s “apparent willingness to allow West to testify to anything and 
everything so long as the defense is permitted to cross-examine him may be 
expedient for prosecutors but it is harmful to the criminal justice system.”68   
West’s testimony also formed part of the state’s narrative in Stubbs.  In that case, 
Stubbs was convicted of, inter alia, an aggravated assault and subsequently 
challenged the admission of bite-mark evidence against her. At trial, West testified 
that the victim had bite-marks on her hip and that Stubbs could not be excluded from 
being the donor. West concluded this after he had pressed the dental mold of 
Stubbs’s teeth on to the victim’s skin.69 Again, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
followed precedent and found that West was an expert in forensic odontology, and 
because the adversary system allowed Stubbs to attack West’s testimony, the trial 
court had not erred in admitting West’s evidence.70  
Brooks was exonerated by DNA evidence in 200871 and Stubbs’s aggravated assault 
conviction was vacated in June, 2012.72 The state’s narrative in both cases, 
therefore, was materially erroneous – but it was nonetheless able to produce 
‘scientific’ evidence to support its case. Moreover, as the dissent pointed out in 
Brooks, the defense provided ‘science’ to the contrary. West’s evidence in both 
cases is an example of the type of scientific “over-claiming” that can be generated by 
the adversarial system. Over-claiming is associated with more marginal experts. A 
scientist who resists over-claiming is striving to maintain their professional integrity. 
As Hussey Freeland explains, “a scientist who resists framing her work in terms of 
too-high certainty—over-claiming—is not simply being uncooperative, but instead is 
striving to maintain her social identity.”73  
With this in mind, it is important to note that forensics analysts associated with the 
routine practice of crime-solving forensic science disciplines, have historically been, 
and remain, rooted in law enforcement, and not in a particular scientific field. As a 
consequence, these disciplines are neither typically rooted in research that has 
application beyond criminal investigations nor practiced by professionals outside of 
law enforcement. These disciplines can be fragmented, poorly regulated and lack 
standardized procedures,74 as well as resources. Research into their methods can 
be limited, unpublished and narrowly circulated, and there is often a lack of will to 
pursue validation of the methods they employ.75  Despite these limitations, forensic 
analysts are crucial participants in the production of knowledge to be used in criminal 
trials. Those who engage in over-claiming, however, arguably become what 
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Fitzpatrick would term “mythical and magical forms of authority.”76 Quite like Foucault 
described the “mythic heroes of discipline” in asylums, such agents do not introduce 
science into the courtroom, but rather a personality “whose powers borrowed from 
science are only their disguise, or at most their justification.”77 Law, in this context, is 
engaging scientific administration in “all its mythic purity…as the very nature of 
things, set beyond the doubts and diversities that compromise it in operation.”78 
The law can distort science; minimising its rigour, care and professionalism in the 
process. Cases such as U.S. v. Hicks79, U.S. v. Mitchell80 and U.S. v. Baines81 
provide examples of this. In Hicks, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit approved as reliable trial testimony provided by the state’s ballistics expert 
that the suspect cases were fired from a rifle found at Hick’s residence. This was 
based, in part, on the court accepting testimony that the discipline’s error rate was 
“zero or near to zero.”82 In Mitchell and Baines the courts willingly accepted that 
fingerprint identification had a very low error rate.83 Ultimately, the scientific method 
may prove that both disciplines have extremely low error rates. However, at the time 
of writing (and certainly the determination of these three cases) that is not a scientific 
fact. In 2009, the National Research Council (NRC) reported that claims of a zero 
error rate in fingerprint identification are clearly “unrealistic”84 as the discipline is not 
(yet) properly underpinned by science.85 The NRC made similar comments about 
firearms identification evidence,, concluding that “the scientific knowledge base for 
tool mark and firearms analysis is fairly limited”86 and in order to make the process of 
individualization more precise and repeatable, “additional studies should be 
performed.”87 
These cases also show how the courts are willing to inject certainty into provisional 
facts. As Jasanoff has explained, “the law accept[s] facts that science might still 
deem provisional…Scientific facts needed to resolve legal disputes frequently come 
into being only as those disputes unfold. They are not available before the fact in 
some convenient storehouse of relevant, well-documented, yet case-specific facts.”88 
This acceptance of provisional facts can be seen in other cases too. For instance, in 
U.S. v. Crisp,89 which concerned fingerprint identification evidence, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals conceded, despite approving individualization evidence, that 
“further research...and the development of even more consistent professional 
standards was desirable.”90  
The case of U.S. v. Aman is similar.91 In that case, a U.S. District Court in Virginia 
acknowledged the concerns of the NRC and conceded that “[t]he absence of a 
known error rate, the lack of population studies, and the involvement of examiner 
judgment all raise important questions about the rigorousness of friction ridge 
analysis.”92 The District Court agreed that further testing and study would enhance 
the precision and reviewability of fingerprint examiners’ work,93 but, relying on Crisp, 
ruled that Aman’s challenge to the reliability of the fingerprint evidence allegedly 
linking him to an arson fire was not meritorious.94 Notably, both courts considered 
that cross-examination was the appropriate remedy for challenging “shaky” forensic 
identification evidence.95 As discussed in Part II(C) infra, however, this reliance is 
arguably misplaced because it ignores the difficulties associated with the social 
context of challenging forensic science evidence.  
Cases such as Brooks, Stubbs, Hicks, Mitchell, Baines, Crisp and Aman all 
provide examples of how facts in law and facts in science differ, and, ultimately, what 
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both institutions count as “truth.” These cases go towards affirming Jasanoff’s view 
that, “what counts as true for the law need not count as true for science, and in 
exceptional cases even scientific truths may not be accepted as valid for legal 
purposes.”96   
This all demonstrates the most salient difference between legally relevant facts and 
normal scientific facts, namely that legal facts are “frequently specific to the cases 
they are supposed to illuminate, whereas scientific facts are expected to have more 
general validity.”97 To count as probative, legal facts must have sui generis qualities 
i.e., be unique to the case at hand. This is illustrated by case law related to newly 
discovered evidence claims. For instance, petitioners have alleged that the criticism 
aimed at standard tool-mark identification evidence is newly discovered evidence. 
The appellate courts have responded conservatively to these claims, choosing to (1) 
defer to lower court decisions disqualifying such criticism as newly discovered 
evidence; and (2) reject that the findings of the 2009 NRC Report – including the 
unprecedented finding that individualization was not proper in forensic disciplines 
such as firearms identification - are newly discovered evidence. These cases show 
that the shift in scientific opinion contained in the NRC Report, with regards to 
firearms identification evidence, fails to qualify as newly discovered evidence. This is 
largely because courts take the view that the report presents no “new” facts given 
that it cites to older research and lacks specificity to individual cases.98 Cole and 
Edmond have noted how the judiciary’s intense focus on specificity has made it 
difficult for petitioners to apply general concerns from the NRC Report to specific 
case issues.99 Courts are interested in relevant evidence bearing on facts in issue in 
the specific proceedings. As it stands, petitioners are failing to bridge the gap 
between the NRC Report’s findings and the impact they have on their individual 
case. This failure tends to be fatal to the “verdict changing capacity” requirement of 
newly discovered evidence rules.100   
The situation is similar in relation to other forensic science identification methods, 
namely fingerprint analysis, microscopic hair analysis, shoe-print analysis and blood 
stain pattern analysis. The cases of Johnston v. State,101 Enderle v. Iowa,102 and 
Pennsylvania v. Edmiston103 demonstrate this. Again, these cases show that the 
courts’ demand for probative evidence that bears on the specific facts at issue, in the 
single case before them, is fatal for newly discovered evidence claims. In other 
words, the sui generis nature of adversarial legal proceedings has been used to limit 
the impact of the 2009 NRC Report to support newly discovered evidence claims.104 
In light of these findings, lawyers should revise how they approach these claims, as 
discussed in Part III.  The law’s demand for specificity hinders its ability to change its 
approach or, more specifically, to change established precedent. Precedent is the 
law’s way of tying everything to the past. This is at odds with the progressive nature 
of science, which tends to look forward.105 The courts’ approach to generally reject 
challenges to the reliability of forensic science identification evidence are perhaps 
illustrative of when, due to the methodological differences between science and law, 
“Recalcitrance can be endemic…”106 Given the progressive nature of science, there 
will always remain areas where the dominance of science is not accepted and 
“recalcitrants are not prepared to submit to its operatives or to the necessity of 
fact.”107 In these situations, the law’s institutional frameworks, in effect, cause 
science to fail. This, Fitzpatrick argues, “has to be recognised and dealt with.”108 In 
such instances, science cannot be simply interpreted and applied – it has to be 
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enforced. All this illustrates how science can be “dangerously” misconstrued by 
law.109 To defend science against this (and enforce it properly), however, the law 
must embrace the view that scientific progress can require change. However, as 
sub-section (B) explains, the law can be sceptical about change that is urged by 
scientific progress. 
B. Law’s Scepticism About Change 
Scientific progress has revealed that individualization claims made by numerous 
forensic science disciplines are unreliable. This NRC Report’s conclusions exemplify 
such progress. The law, however, is yet to embrace this progression. Judges, it 
seems, are happier “accepting some knowledge of the past than of the future”110 and 
reflect what Midgley labels as the “imaginative difficulty” associated with being on the 
cusp of a paradigm shift.111 
The courts’ sceptical approach is underpinned by their institutional loyalty to 
precedent. For example, if a judge knows that precedent dictates that 
individualization testimony by bite-mark examiners is admissible evidence, he is 
likely to (at least as a starting position) reason that all individualization evidence by 
all bite-mark examiners is admissible.  
A number of cases demonstrate this sort of reasoning. Brooks112 is a prime example 
in the context of bite-mark evidence. In that case, despite concerns about Dr. West 
and the fact other experts found inconsistencies between the bite-mark and Brooks’ 
teeth, the majority took the chance, on the basis of precedent, to “state affirmatively 
that bite mark identification evidence is admissible in Mississippi.”113 This sort of 
broad-brush avoids an immediate examination and discourages a future examination 
of the substance of the tension between law and science in this context. As Beecher-
Monas has found, “By far the most widely used gate-keeping avoidance technique 
that judges employ is admitting bite-mark evidence because other courts have done 
so.”114 
The same judicial approach has been noted in relation to tool-mark identification 
evidence. Case law concerning the admissibility of tool-mark identification evidence 
is “typified by decisions admitting such testimony with little, and usually no, reference 
to legal authority beyond broad ‘discretion and an adroit sidestepping of any judicial 
duty to assure that experts’ claims are valid.”115 As Faigman et al summarize, 
“Appellate courts defer to trial courts, and trial courts defer to juries. Later appellate 
courts simply defer to earlier appellate courts.”116 The crux of the issue is this: the 
number of years that a particular precedent (concerning the admissibility of a 
particular forensic identification discipline) has been applied for, should not be 
viewed as indicative of that discipline having scientific validity or the relevant 
conclusion being scientifically reliable. Unfortunately, however, some courts do see 
things this way. For example, in Mitchell, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit rejected a challenge to fingerprint identification evidence on the basis 
that, amongst other things, it had been tested by one hundred years of application in 
the adversarial system.117 Such reasoning doesn’t inject efficacy into the law, but 




The sceptical view of change reflected by the judicial opinions explored in this article 
exemplifies how the institutions of science and law view the concept of “bedrock.” 
For science, achieving “bedrock”, i.e., sedimentation of scientific knowledge is 
desirable, but ultimately the primary concern of science is “preventing flaws from 
settling into the precipitating knowledge, so that the bedrock will be less likely to 
crack as more new knowledge settles upon it.”118 Having said that, it should be 
acknowledged that there are numerous examples of scientific communities standing 
still despite the existence of a large evidence base pointing towards a particular 
conclusion,119 and snubbing the research of pioneering scientists. In fact, the 
research of Watson and Crick that eventually led to the discovery of the structure of 
DNA is an example of the latter.120 Still, science is generally progressive.  
By contrast, the main aim of the law is to maintain social order. The law, of course, 
allows for some flexibility so that it might adapt in line with changing social conditions 
and progressing scientific thought. In fact, there are numerous examples of 
American courts rejecting scientific disciplines on the basis that progressing thought 
has found them to be unreliable. Sometimes this judicial practice is ab initio i.e., from 
the beginning. The wide rejection of polygraph evidence following Frye v. U.S.121 in 
1923 is an example of this, although it should be noted some courts have departed 
from this ruling.122 Courts have also rejected evidence elicited by hypnosis, with 
researchers finding that hypnotically elicited recall is per se inadmissible in 27 
states.123 More often, however, rejection of scientific evidence is more gradual and 
subtle. For instance, in recent years, following further medical research, some courts 
(including the United States Supreme Court) have voiced concerns about the validity 
of Shaken Baby Syndrome as a medical diagnosis.124  This slower approach is more 
common in the law because, ultimately, for law, sedimentation and the formation of 
new bedrock so closure can be achieved is favoured.125 In other words, a strong 
fidelity to finality, precedent, and consistency in judicial decision-making are the 
order of legal business, even if legitimate scientific discovery suggests they shouldn’t 
be. Sudden changes made to long-term precedents can, ironically, be quickly 
snubbed out.  
The Llera Plaza cases demonstrate this point in the context of fingerprint 
individualization evidence. In 2002, Judge Pollak of the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania made an unprecedented decision. In U.S.v. Llera 
Plaza (Llera Plaza I),126 Judge Pollak held that “no expert witness for any party will 
be permitted to testify that, in the opinion of the witness, a particular latent print is—
or is not—the print of a particular person.”127 Judge Pollak’s ruling was the first 
‘successful’ defense challenge to fingerprint identification evidence.128 Still, Llera 
Plaza I was short-lived. Weeks later, Judge Pollak reversed his decision. In so doing, 
Judge Pollak bowed to precedent, stating “to postpone present in-court utilization of 
this ‘bedrock forensic identifier’ pending such research would be to make the best 
the enemy of the good.”129  
Case law concerning challenges to the veracity of individualization claims by certain 
forensic sciences provides support for Midgley’s view that myths do not alter quickly 
or in a wholesale way.130  Testimony that a fingerprint can be “matched” to a 
suspect, tool-marks on suspect ammunition can be “matched” to a suspect gun, and 
bite-marks on a victim’s body can be “matched” to a suspect’s dentition, has been 
admissible in American courtrooms for decades.131 As such, the ideas that such 
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testimony conveys are arguably the types of “prominent ideas”132 that Midgley 
suggests cannot “die” until the problems within them have been resolved.133 In the 
instant context, this resolution might fairly be interpreted to mean that precedents 
allowing the largely unreserved admission of such individualization evidence cannot 
“die” until stakeholders in the criminal justice system internally resolve the 
controversy surrounding these disciplines in some way, shape or form. 
Newly discovered evidence cases relating to Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis 
(CBLA) evidence arguably provide support for this idea. This is because they show a 
shift in judicial approach after stakeholders in the criminal justice process 
collaborated to address problems associated with prominent (but ultimately 
inaccurate) ideas about the reliability of CBLA evidence. Historically, CBLA evidence 
had been used to show that "bullets came from the same box, the same 
manufacturer, were related in time or geography, or generally linked the defendant to 
the crime in some unspecified manner.”134 The reliability of this method, however, 
has been significantly criticised. Consequently, some petitioners have argued that 
the criticism represents a shift in scientific opinion that qualifies as newly discovered 
evidence. These claims have generally triggered judicial intervention in favour of the 
petitioner.135 Concerns about the ‘newness’ of the criticism aimed at CBLA evidence 
and how probative that criticism is to a particular case (given it comes from sources 
unrelated to specific cases) have seemingly been side-lined by the judiciary. This is 
in stark contrast to how the judiciary has approached newly discovered evidence 
claims on the basis of the 2009 NRC Report as it relates to other forensic science 
disciplines.  As previously discussed, such claims rarely trigger relief.136 One 
explanation for the unusual judicial approach towards CBLA evidence may well be 
that there was a wider multi-institutional response across the criminal justice system 
to concerns about the use of CBLA evidence.137 This included the FBI forcing the 
discontinuance of CBLA evidence in 2004, after a report questioning its validity was 
published by the National Academy of Sciences.138 This result suggests that multi-
agency collaboration is a useful way to encourage the legal process to acknowledge 
scientific progress and adapt judicial decision-making accordingly. As such, the 
author further explores the idea of multi-stakeholder collaboration in Part III infra. 
The ‘death’ of a myth is not common or quick. Rather, Midgley says such ideas are 
more likely to “transform themselves gradually into something different…”139  Case 
law concerning firearms identification evidence reflects this idea.  From 2005 
onwards, some courts began to discourage individualization testimony by firearms 
examiners and curtail the language experts used to connect weapons to suspect 
ammunition. In U.S. v. Green,140 the trial court admitted expert testimony but refused 
to allow the expert to conclude that the shell casings came from a specific pistol to 
the exclusion of every other firearm: “That conclusion—that there is a definitive 
match—stretches well beyond [the expert’s] data and methodology.”141 The expert 
was permitted to describe his observations and comparisons regarding the shell 
casings.142 The same court considered a similar challenge weeks later in U.S. v. 
Monteiro.143 In Monteiro, the defendant sought to exclude expert testimony that 
suspect cartridge cases matched firearms linked to him. The court rejected the 
defendant’s challenge, finding that the underlying scientific principle of 
individualization in firearm identification was valid.  But on the basis that an 
identification is largely subjective, and there is no existing reliable statistical or 
scientific methodology that allows an expert to testify to a match to an absolute 
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certainty, the expert was only allowed to testify to a “reasonable degree of ballistic 
certainty.”144 
Similarly, in U.S. v. Diaz,145 the court found that individualization claims in the 
firearms-identification field were not supported. Thus, the court only allowed the 
examiners to testify “that a match has been made to a ‘reasonable degree of 
certainty in the ballistics field.’”146 In U.S. v. Glynn,147 the trend continued. In Glynn, 
the court concluded that allowing the examiner to testify that he had matched 
ammunition to a particular gun “to a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” would 
“seriously mislead the jury as to the nature of the expertise involved.”148 To resolve 
this problem, the court (1) limited the expert to testifying that a firearms match was 
“more likely than not;” (2) prevented the expert from testifying that he reached his 
conclusions to any degree of certainty; and (3) prevented the expert from testifying 
that ballistics was a science.149  Some courts continued this conservative trend after 
the publication of the NRC Report. For example, in U.S. v. Taylor,150 the court 
admitted the firearms identification evidence but limited the examiner to testifying 
that the ammunition came from the defendant’s rifle within a “reasonable degree of 
certainty in the firearms examination field.”151 
A few courts have also expressed concern about the form of expert testimony in 
cases involving fingerprint evidence152 and bite-mark evidence.153 Still, the most 
notable shift in perspective accounted for in the cases of Green, Monteiro, Diaz, 
Glynn and Taylor, only goes towards showing how the law avoids the real 
substance of its tension with science in this context by oversimplifying the problem. 
As sub-section (C) explores, this reductionist approach engenders a narrow 
approach to rationality that can divorce science from its social context to the 
detriment of substantive accuracy. 
C. Law’s Narrow Construction of Rationality 
Taking a reductionist approach to concepts related to the legal analysis of scientific 
evidence allows the law to develop rationality in its decision-making processes. In an 
intellectual world, reductionism offers order and simplicity.154 The engendering of 
rationality and regularity is particularly fundamental to the law. This can be seen in 
the case law examined in the article (and beyond). This is because these cases 
demonstrate a high level of judicial fidelity to ideals associated with legal process 
theory.   
At the centre of the legal process vision is the principle of institutional settlement. 
This principle theorizes that that it is procedural regularity in the decision-making 
process of a competent institution that legitimizes the institution’s decisions, not 
whether its decisions are substantively accurate. Procedure is critically important 
because it, inter alia, provides an effective way of obtaining “good” decisions, 
facilitates the collaboration of institutions in an interconnected institutional system 
(like the criminal justice system), and enhances the legitimacy of the law by 
generating consistency.155 The trouble with a largely unreserved loyalty to the legal 
process vision, however, is that it can tend to “exalt the form over the substance of 
what is being said, the method over the aim of an activity, and precision of detail 
over the completeness of cover.”156  
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For instance, if we consider the cases of Green, Monteiro, Diaz, Glynn and Taylor 
examined in sub-section (B). In those cases, the judiciary have moved away from 
allowing firearms experts to testify in absolute terms of individualization; instead 
requiring them to testify in, allegedly, more diluted terms such as “more likely than 
not” and “to a reasonable ballistic certainty.” This approach, which appears to be a 
judicial attempt to rationalise the criticism aimed at individualization evidence in the 
context of firearms identification, boils down the tension between law and science to 
a simple matter of terminology. This is problematic, however. This is because even 
initial research studies in to this ‘question of interpretation’ have shown that both 
judges and jurors are comfortable converting subjective probability evidence into 
findings of liability.157 As such, restricting firearms examiners (and other such experts 
for that matter) to phrases such as “to a reasonable degree of certainty” and “more 
likely than not” may well not have the desired effect of deterring jurors from 
inaccurately thinking there is an absolute “match” between suspect ammunition and 
a known weapon. In other words, this reductionist approach overlooks relevant social 
concepts, i.e., how the terminology will be interpreted by the social actors involved in 
the criminal justice process.  
For instance, although she takes the view that not allowing testimony indicating 
“absolute certainty” or “scientific certainty” is a step in the right direction, Bonnie 
Lanigan is mindful that alternative, diluted phrases could be confusing for jurors.158 In 
relation to firearms evidence, she notes that “the phrase “ballistic certainty”--
especially when “ballistics” is not an accurate term as it encompasses all projectiles--
may not sound that different to a juror from the phrase “scientific certainty.”159 Both 
phrases imply certainty that doesn’t yet exist in this discipline.160  
The idea that this reductionist approach overlooks the complex assessments 
undertaken by jurors when confronted with such evidence, is supported by a study 
published in 2015.161 This study examined the way that a sample (i.e., potential 
jurors) responded to two types of forensic evidence, namely a DNA comparison and 
a shoeprint comparison, when an expert explained the strength of the evidence in 
three different ways.162 The findings of the study suggest that “perceptions of 
forensic science evidence are shaped by prior beliefs and expectations as well as 
expert testimony…”163 It underscores, therefore, that there are qualitative aspects to 
individuals’ assessment of forensic evidence, including value judgments about 
credibility, the risk of error, how the forensic evidence fits with other evidence 
presented in the case, and how it is popularized and conveyed by the media and 
other literature.164 All this supports this author’s overall point, namely that there is a 
far more complex social context to this routine courtroom interaction between ‘expert’ 
and jury, than the judiciary’s reductionist approach takes account of.  
Cases such as U.S. v. Gutierrez-Castro165 also demonstrate a boiling down of the 
tension created by scientific progress to one of terminology, but in a slightly different 
context. In that case, the state wanted to introduce the testimony of James McNutt. 
McNutt would testify that suspect prints belonged to Gutierrez-Castro. Gutierrez-
Castro argued that, while McNutt was a certified fingerprint examiner and that he had 
completed several classes on fingerprint analysis, the 2009 NRC Report “indicate[d] 
that certification may not be a valid indication of knowledge or ability.”166 Gutierrez-
Castro argued there was no standardised or approved method of certification; hence 
McNutt was not qualified to offer expert testimony about fingerprint analysis. The 
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court rejected Gutierrez-Castro’s argument, seemingly siding with the state’s 
argument that McNutt had undertaken demanding training culminating in regular 
proficiency tests.167 The court was not deterred by concerns that most proficiency 
tests do not reflect real-life conditions. However, reducing the problem to a matter of 
terminology, the court gave permission for McNutt to testify, but would not allow: (1) 
the state to offer him as an expert witness in the jury’s presence; (2) the trial court to 
certify McNutt as an expert witness in the jury’s presence; and (3) allow the jury 
instructions to refer to McNutt as an expert.168  
The Gutierrez-Castro decision arguably attempts to engage in the social context 
aspects relevant to the tension between the law and science at issue.  The court 
attempts to respond to the idea that jurors are easily seduced by people described 
as ‘experts’ and as a consequence pay little attention to the veracity of the discipline 
they are tasked with judging.169 In the context of fingerprint identification this is 
arguably a positive step as, for example, studies have found that a vast majority of 
jurors agree that fingerprint identification is a ‘science’ and that fingerprints are the 
most reliable means of identification.170 Still, expert labels are not necessarily 
relevant to the greater social context issue, namely how jurors interpret testimony 
that conclusively links a suspect to evidence via a forensic science method of 
identification. This opportunity is, in effect, bypassed.  
All told, these shifts in terminology can end up being cosmetic noises that simply 
contribute towards disguising the uncertainty pervading these disciplines. As 
recognised by the National Commission on Forensic Science’s Sub-committee on 
Reporting and Testimony, these phrases are meaningless in a scientific sense.171 
They are not used by experts outsides of courtrooms and the legal process should 
not insist that they are used.172 Moreover forensics science service providers “should 
not endorse or promote the use of this terminology.”173 
This avoidance of the greater social context is also evident when considering cases 
where the courts have rationalised their rejection of challenges to forensic science 
identification evidence on the basis of finality interests.  The doctrine of finality 
developed out of a taxonomy detailed by Professor Paul M. Bator in 1963.174 Bator 
argued that the finality of criminal judgments serves important interests that are 
harmed by expansions of post-conviction rights, and proposed that because we can 
never be 100% certain that no error of law or fact was made during trial (or 
appellate) proceedings, “we must impose an end to litigation at some point or else 
the case could conceivably go on ad infinitum” i.e., forever.175 Legal process is the 
focal point of Bator’s taxonomy.176 According to Bator, the efficacy of outcomes 
produced by the criminal justice system (such as jury verdicts and trial court 
decisions) require the application of a procedural model that provides “a reasoned 
and acceptable probability that justice will be done.”177 When faced with post-
conviction challenges, therefore, process thinkers ask such questions as: did the 
measures and processes of the trial court give the petitioner a full and fair 
opportunity to challenge the case against him and present his own case?  If so, the 
legal process vision dictates that the outcome is legitimate (whether it is 
substantively accurate or not).178  
Consequently, the process model simultaneously protects finality interests by 
restricting the means to usurp a rationally processed conviction. This approach 
underpins post-conviction frameworks across America, and pervades the rationales 
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of appellate judges considering challenges to evidence post-conviction. It is now 
widely accepted that finality is an umbrella term used to cover a variety of interests 
including ensuring respect for criminal judgments and victims’ rights, conserving 
state resources, furthering the efficiency and deterrent and educational functions of 
the criminal law, satisfying the human need for closure, incentivising defense 
counsel to “get it right first time” and preventing a flood of non-controversial claims 
from masking the fewer, credible ones.179 As such, finality is a reductionist concept; 
boiling down many complex and varied considerations into single headlines. 
Again, this reductionist approach has the result of divorcing science from its social 
context in the criminal justice process.  For instance, in an article published in 
2014,180 the author examined case law where courts had rejected challenges to the 
veracity of firearms identification evidence. The author identified that the courts 
tended to rely on two particular finality interests, namely preventing non-controversial 
claims from flooding the system and incentivising defense counsel, when rejecting 
these challenges. In relation to preventing non-controversial claims flooding the 
system, the author identified that courts often conclude the admission of such 
evidence was “non-prejudicial” in light of other evidence against the petitioner. In 
other words, courts are terming the (legally sound or unsound) admission of firearms 
identification evidence as non-controversial. In relation to incentivising defense 
counsel, the courts emphasize the importance of the adversarial system, i.e., 
defense counsel’s ability to weed out frailties in forensic evidence via cross-
examination.181 Notably, the author has also found that this finality interest is also 
predominantly used to rationalise rejections to challenges to the veracity of 
fingerprint identification evidence.182 In those cases, the courts indicate a belief that 
that the adversarial system will function to resolve and neutralize any post-NRC 
Report concerns about the reliability of fingerprint evidence.183 In light of these 
findings, lawyers should shape challenges to the veracity of forensic science 
evidence with a view to addressing judicial reliance on these finality interests. This 
idea is discussed in more detail in Part III, infra. 
In both instances the courts are oversimplifying the tension that has resulted from, in 
particular, the progressive scientific thought contained in the 2009 NRC Report; 
boiling the uncertainty about forensic science created down to an issue that is to be 
resolved by the adversarial process.  Again, this approach divorces science from its 
social context. This is because it overlooks the difficulties that the social actors 
involved in the adversarial model – in particular lawyers and jurors - have in handling 
scientific evidence accurately. More specifically, it overlooks the difficulties lawyers 
have in resourcing, making and understanding challenges to forensic evidence, the 
high impact scientific evidence has on jurors, and the difficulty they have in 
accurately evaluating scientific evidence.184  
Notably, judges can experience similar difficulties to jurors and lawyers, which can 
also be sidelined by the desire of the legal process to achieve rationality through the 
favouring of finality interests. This is demonstrated by the interpretation of newly 
discovered evidence rules when petitioners claim there has been a shift in scientific 
opinion in a forensic science discipline that qualifies as newly discovered evidence. 
To safeguard finality interests, newly discovered evidence rules employ high 
thresholds that typically involve “…some combination of showings that the new 
evidence could not have been discovered prior to trial with the exercise of 
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reasonable diligence; that the evidence is relevant and not cumulative or merely 
impeaching; and that the new evidence creates a sufficient probability of a different 
result at a new trial.”185 When applying these rules, appellate courts largely avoid a 
detailed examination of the questions raised when a petitioner argues there has 
been a shift in scientific opinion with regards to the identification capabilities of a 
forensic science discipline; therefore avoiding the tension generated by scientific 
progress.186   
This avoidance is reflected beyond newly discovered evidence cases. Numerous 
courts considering admissibility related challenges to forensic science identification 
evidence, on the basis of the 2009 NRC Report, have also avoided an examination 
of the report’s contents. These courts have taken a reductionist approach by 
minimizing the report’s impact to single, generic issues. These issues are that the 
report did not conclude that there should be a wholesale exclusion of forensic 
science individualization evidence, and did not intend to answer the question 
whether forensic evidence in a particular case is admissible under applicable law.187  
This approach to rationality allows the courts to sideline the findings of the NRC 
Report with relative ease, and thus avoid the progressive thought it represents. This 
approach is unsurprising because there is “a natural judicial tendency to avoid any 
deep confrontations with science.”188 Rather, courts prefer to prioritize legal process 
ideals over substantive accuracy, and these ideals may have “little or no application 
to science.”189  
Moreover, courts suffer from a number of institutional deficiencies (in addition to 
those suffered by lawyers and jurors) when it comes to accurately assessing 
progressive scientific thought. For example, returning to a consideration of newly 
discovered evidence rules, appellate courts are used to (and therefore generally 
good at) assessing legal error, as opposed to factual error. Newly discovered 
evidence rules, however, are primarily “fact based”190 and require a factual 
assessment of the qualification, timing, quality, relevance and impact of ‘new’ facts. 
Consequently, they require courts to step outside of their comfort zone, particularly in 
the context of assessments relating to progressing science. Additionally, the fact-
based assessments associated with newly discovered evidence claims can be 
onerous and ill-suited for comity and efficiency based institutional agendas, and, 
indeed, the expertise of judges. Newly discovered evidence rules typically require at 
least five factual assessments: Is the evidence a new fact? Was the new fact 
discoverable before trial? Did the petitioner exercise reasonable diligence in 
discovering and presenting the new fact? Is the new fact relevant and probative? 
And, does the new fact have verdict changing capacity?191  
These sorts of questions are also “non-binary” in nature192 and courts are poorly 
situated to resolve them.193 This is because “When a court is asked to resolve a 
question science itself has not resolved, it is simply unequipped to do so because 
legal values--and more particularly, the judicial process--do not employ the scientific 
method.”194 Consider the following example:  
Patrick is charged with murder in 1990. At his trial in 1991, the prosecution alleges 
Patrick set fire to a liquor store, killing three people inside. A state fire analyst 
testifies that the crime scene presented numerous “hallmarks of arson”, including 
brown stains on the floors and spider-webbed glass. As a consequence, the analyst 
testified that this was “definitely” an arson fire, i.e., a fire started by an accelerant. 
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The analyst testified that he followed guidelines produced by the National Fire 
Protection Agency (NFPA) when undertaking his investigation.195 The record shows 
that the defense lawyer cross-examined him about his conformity with these 
deadlines, including the analyst’s rejection of alternative, non-arson causes. The 
state also presents evidence that, when stopped for jay walking near to the liquor 
store, Patrick was found in possession of an accelerant in his trouser pocket. Patrick 
claimed the accelerant was for use on his home BBQ. In 2016, the State Justice 
Project (on behalf of Patrick) files a newly discovered evidence claim based on an 
allegedly “new” fact, namely that the hallmarks of arson have been discredited. In 
other words, they claim there has been a shift in scientific opinion that undermines 
Patrick’s conviction. In fact, the project alleges the new evidence – in the form of an 
expert affidavit – proves there was no arson at all, and the fire was an accident. The 
project’s interest in Patrick’s case was triggered in 2009 by the NRC Report, which 
found that conclusions by fire investigators that a particular fire was arson, on the 
basis of rules of thumb, are not well founded.196 Judge Schofield assesses Patrick’s 
claim in appellate court.   
Presented with the type of non-binary questions detailed above, Judge Schofield will 
likely struggle to address certain issues accurately. This is partly because some of 
the questions relate to scientific uncertainty.  For instance, whether the criticism of 
arson indicators qualifies as new and was not discoverable before trial, requires an 
exploration of when the hallmarks were first criticised, and whether a unacceptable 
level of scientific uncertainty remains in the field. The answer to the first question 
may be linked to the year 1990 when the Lime Street Fire Experiment was 
conducted. In short, the Lime Street Fire Experiment demonstrated that so-called 
“arson hallmarks” could also present at a fire scene, absent the use of an 
accelerant.197 The 2009 NRC Report lent support to the experiment’s findings in 
2009.198 This experiment highlighted what is now a fundamental issue in arson 
investigations, namely that experts cannot, with certainty, determine that a fire was 
arson on the basis of the “hallmarks” alone, as they can be present in both 
accidental and incendiary fires. Moreover, such signs cannot alone prove conclusive 
of intent.  
In addition, given Patrick was tried in 1991, evidence of the Lime Street Fire 
Experiment was arguably discoverable before trial. However, given Patrick’s trial was 
so soon after the experiment, it is questionable whether the findings of the 
experiment were available to Patrick’s lawyer and of sufficient weight to challenge 
the prosecution’s case at that time.  
As such, to make an accurate assessment of whether Patrick has brought a “new” 
fact to the court, which was not discoverable before his trial, the judge must engage 
in the near impossible task of resolving the remaining scientific uncertainty himself.  
The judge’s task would be much easier if he was required to accurately determine 
binary questions, such as: has there been criticism of the hallmarks of arson? Or is 
there evidence that non-arson fires present evidence such as spider-web glass and 
brown stains? Faced with these binary questions, the judge could no doubt make an 
accurate determination without great difficulty. However, this is not the case.  
There are also issues in relation to diligence. Over two decades have passed since 
the Lime Street Fire Experiment was conducted, and it has been seven years since 
the publication of the 2009 NRC Report. As such, Patrick will likely struggle to show 
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diligence in making the claim too. In addition, the fact that the state’s expert at trial 
testified that he followed the NFPA guidelines, and defense counsel cross-examined 
the expert closely with regards to alternative causes, it will likely be difficult for 
Patrick to demonstrate that the “new” criticism has verdict changing capacity. This is 
because it is rational for an appellate judge to consider that alternative causes were 
considered and rejected by the jury at first instance, and therefore a retrial of those 
causes would be fruitless. In addition, given hallmarks of arson continue to be used 
as conclusive indicators of arson, scientific uncertainty remains in the discipline. 
There remains a lack of certainty about when investigators can associate certain 
signs at fire scenes with arson, and, indeed, when those signs are indicative of 
intent.  
The law’s desire to generate rationality through reductionist approaches, therefore, 
overlooks the social context of the criminal justice process and, in particular, the 
difficulties social actors in that process have in engaging with scientific evidence. 
The law’s concern for social order “overrides what science deems to be the facts of 
the matter.”199 Ultimately, this approach sidelines substantive accuracy, supporting 
Midgley’s point that, “errors in fact spring from an unduly narrow, monopolistic 
concept of rationality.”200 
 
Part III: Recommendations for Reform 
The law must improve its approach towards integrating the fruits of scientific 
progress, in the context of the forensic science disciplines explored, into its 
procedures for determining and reviewing criminal liability. It must do this in order to 
improve its ability to generate substantively accurate results. There are – as set out 
below - a number of ideas by which this might be achieved.  
Open-mindedness to Change and Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration  
The starting point for meaningful change is for stakeholders in the criminal justice 
system to meaningfully and uniformly admit that there are deficiencies in current 
practices related to forensic science. As Midgley suggests, when it comes to making 
meaningful change and eradicating error, particularly in relation to ideas that are 
deep in our psyche, (or, indeed for law, entrenched in decades of precedent, robust 
procedural rules and social ordering polices), we must admit error and initiate 
change “aloud.”201   
Ultimately, judges, lawyers, law enforcement, forensic scientists, policy-makers and 
law-makers, must engage a revised philosophy about the system’s handling of 
scientific progress. To change the wider reality, all of these stakeholders must work 
together to improve the criminal justice system’s use of forensic science.  They must 
accept some basic yet fundamental ideas. This includes the notions that scientific 
progress is inevitable; individualization claims by numerous forensic science 
disciplines are not scientifically valid; social actors in the criminal justice process 
often struggle to accurately assess scientific evidence; and rational procedures can 
produce substantively erroneous results. Moreover, they must accept that all of 
these current ideas are subject to revision. Further research might eventually prove 
them wrong.  
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One way to encourage stakeholders to accept these ideas is to create forums where 
they can be discussed openly and collectively. The creation of formal forums 
(perhaps labelled forensic science commissions), which allow cross-collaboration 
between judges, lawyers, law enforcement, forensic scientists, policy-makers and 
law-makers, could help improve cultural boundaries between stakeholders who have 
diverging interests.202 Innocence Commissions provide a good example of how such 
an approach can be successful. Innocence Commissions generally aim to combat 
wrongful conviction by bringing together representatives from across a state’s 
criminal justice system. The rationale for requiring such varied membership is so 
when problems are discussed and reforms proposed, the differing viewpoints of the 
stakeholders are taken into account. This, in turn, injects legitimacy into the workings 
and products of the commission.203 It is not easy to get usually autonomous actors to 
engage in coordinated and uniform change, given how sceptical they might be about 
each other’s agendas. However, it has been shown such scepticism can be a key 
ingredient to ensuring success. Scepticism often leads to stakeholders not wanting 
to be isolated from discussions and decisions, and therefore more amenable to 
developing long-term, open dialogues.204 These sorts of forums offer a ‘safe’ 
environment for stakeholders to deliver candid opinions and listen to different 
perspectives. They provide a platform for understanding and compromise.  
The creation of state-focused forensic science commissions that have a diverse 
membership would provide stakeholders with this opportunity. Basing these 
commissions within states would also allow for the idiosyncrasies of each state’s 
laws, resources, procedures and practices to be taken into consideration. The work 
of these commissions could also inform national efforts to improve forensic science 
practices, such as the work of the National Commission on Forensic Science,205 and 
provide a mechanism for supporting nationally recommended or prescribed policies.  
In addition, it is known that multi-agency concern about, and challenge to, the 
reliability of forensic science can instigate change that is aimed at ensuring the legal 
process remedies substantive error. The system’s experience with CBLA evidence, 
as discussed earlier, is example of this. A more recent example is the FBI’s ongoing 
review of several thousand cases involving microscopic hair analysis.206 This review 
was instigated by concerns from across the criminal justice system about the 
reliability of this forensic discipline, and is part of a collaboration between the FBI, 
The Innocence Project, the National Association of Defense Lawyers and the U.S. 
Department of Justice.207 
Increased Training for Relevant Institutions and Social Actors 
The idea that non-scientists involved in the legal process would benefit from 
increased training in the methods, analysis and interpretation of scientific evidence is 
not new. Two ideas lie at the heart of this urgent need. First is the law’s heavy 
reliance on forensic science evidence and, second, is the fact that social actors in 
the legal process (especially lawyers, judges and jurors) struggle to engage 
accurately with scientific evidence.208  
Despite this, efforts to implement mechanisms for providing training for these social 
actors remain limited. There “is no uniform curriculum, standardized training model, 
or set of training material on a national level that can be easily accessed.”209 To help 
resolve this issue, the National Commission on Forensic Science’s sub-committee 
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on Science and Law Training has recommended (in the format of a draft Directive 
Recommendation) the implementation of such a curriculum.210 
It is recommended by the sub-committee that the curriculum include the following 
topics: the law governing expert opinion and scientific and technical evidence; 
probabilities and statistics; an articulation of the strengths and limitations of forensic 
evidence, including forensic medicine; issues concerning quality assurance, and 
forensic science service providers and forensic medicine service provider 
management, accreditation, and certification; issues related to human factors; and 
specific forensic and social science disciplines likely to come before the courts.211 
The sub-committee suggests that the curriculum be developed by organizations that 
are independent of the Department of Justice,212 and makes use of expertise from 
“both outside of and within forensic disciplines as appropriate.”213 The sub-committee 
wants the curriculum to be completed within 1 year (i.e., in 2016),214 and intends that 
its initial focus be judges and lawyers.215 
The development and implementation of such a curriculum is a step in the right 
direction. It is a long time coming, given the NRC Report gave an initial such 
recommendation in 2009,216 and the National Commission of Forensic Science was 
established in 2013. However, in light of the issues explored in this article, the author 
would urge the following:  
1. The development and implementation of the curriculum should be delivered 
as soon as is practically possible. The lack of expertise amongst social actors 
in the criminal justice process is a continuing issue that impacts the accurate 
adjudication of guilt. The sub-committee should make every effort to comply 
with its relatively strict deadline.  
2. The curriculum should include material about how scientific evidence is 
investigated. It should also take into consideration the work of the sub-
committee on Reporting and Testimony, which is recommending that both the 
scientific and legal communities identify appropriate language, which may be 
used by experts to express conclusions and opinions to the trier of fact, based 
on observations of evidence and data derived from evidence.217  
3. The sub-committee should make use of a wide range of expertise to build the 
curriculum. This is in order to ensure all relevant stakeholders’ needs are 
catered for and to inject legitimacy into its final product. The sub-committee 
should include members from the academic community who can offer advice 
on how best to convey complex material successfully in classrooms.  
4. The needs of law enforcement should be considered from the beginning, 
whether that be as a main consumer of the curriculum above, or a specially 
designed curriculum. Law enforcement should not be side-notes in this 
endeavour because they represent the front-end of the criminal justice 
system. It should follow that the better equipped law enforcement are to 
assess the validity and reliability of scientific evidence during investigations, 
the less likely prosecutions based on erroneous science will go ahead. 
5. The needs of jurors should also not be sidelined. Jurors play a pivotal role in 
assessing the reliability and weight of scientific evidence. Moreover, as 
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discussed earlier, appellate courts routinely defer to jury assessments about 
such evidence. Thought needs to be given to how jurors can be supported to 
accurately undertake this role. Given that jurors are not criminal justice 
professionals, they will likely need bespoke training programmes that suit their 
temporary (yet fundamental) role. 
6. The sub-committee on Science and Law Training has not addressed 
questions about how the development and implementation of the curriculum 
will be resourced.218 This issue needs to be addressed from the start. This is 
because, given the budgetary constraints of the criminal justice system, the 
lack of a long-term resource plan (that governments and providers are 
committed to) inevitably leads to initiatives failing.  
Focused Lawyering Strategies 
This article has included case law examples concerning both admissibility challenges 
to forensic science identification evidence, and newly discovered evidence claims 
that argue that criticism of certain forensic science methodologies is a new fact 
warranting relief. These examples suggest that lawyers should be approaching these 
types of claims in a particular way.  
With regards to admissibility claims, case law demonstrates that appellate courts 
routinely reject challenges to the veracity of forensic science evidence. The author 
has previously identified that courts often do this on the basis that counsel had the 
opportunity to weed out frailties in the evidence at trial, and any such admission was 
not prejudicial to the petitioner, as, in the view of the court, the evidence would not 
have had a significant impact on the jury. With these judicial approaches in mind, 
lawyers should focus their claims. For instance, it is clear that appeals arguing for a 
blanket ruling of inadmissibility are very likely to fail.219 Rather, lawyers need to 
counter judicial reliance on the above finality interests. They can do this by 
underpinning appeals with (1) full reference to the efforts of trial counsel to challenge 
the expert evidence at trial, demonstrating where counsel omitted to make potent 
challenges; and (2) information about how persuasive jurors find such expert 
evidence. This requires lawyers to keep up to date with relevant literature, and public 
defender offices would be well-served to build depositories for such information. 
Also, given current concern about the lack of meaning and impact encompassed in 
such terminology, lawyers should also be cautious about requesting courts to curtail 
expert language in line with cases such as Green, Monteiro, Diaz, Glynn and 
Taylor. Lawyers should monitor both research that seeks to better understand the 
impact of allegedly diluted phrases, and that which seeks to offer solutions for 
presenting more appropriate expert terminology to jurors in this context. 
With regards to newly discovered evidence claims, an examination of the case law 
suggests that lawyers should consider three approaches. First, they should explore 
and present any multi-agency efforts to either acknowledge or initiate a shift in 
thought about the relevant forensic science evidence. This is because the courts 
handling of such claims about CBLA evidence show they are persuaded by multi-
agency efforts. Second, lawyers should challenge the significance of any earlier 
research studies critiquing the forensic science discipline they are challenging, which 
are cited in the NRC Report. This is because courts used these citations to reject the 
idea that the criticism is new. Third, lawyers should address how the NRC Report’s 
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findings are relevant to the case at hand. This is because courts are quick to reject 
the relevance of the report to specific cases.  
Harnessing the Institutional Strength of the Courts 
The courts must acknowledge their unique position to engender change, as it is their 
constitutional role to review the law.220 As such, courts should harness their existing 
institutional strengths for handling scientific evidence accurately.  
This might include embracing the law’s naturally adaptive qualities that allow it to 
change according to progressing social, political and economic landscapes,221 and 
shape the law to be in line with progressing science. To do this, courts need to be 
more critical of forensic science. For instance, judges need to interrogate the 
usefulness of precedent more closely, and not allow the passage of time to dictate 
scientific validity and reliability. Judges must also accept that science has a general 
application. Rejecting criticism like that contained in the NRC Report, on the basis it 
does not have application to a specific case and/or legal issue, lacks sense. In fact, it 
demands the impossible.   
It might also include employing more practical mechanisms. For example, judges 
can use procedures to narrow disputed scientific issues; conduct hearings where the 
court can examine potential experts; and appoint independent experts, special 
masters, and specially trained law clerks.222 Courts also have a convening power,223 
namely the ability to bring together the various actors needed to craft effective 
solutions to multi-dimensional problems, like, for example, progressing science. 
Courts should demand that lawyers and experts, for both the prosecution and 
defense, collaborate (to the extent most possible) to ensure scientific evidence is 
explained accurately and clearly to juries. Courts need to do what they can to 
neutralize the polarization of science naturally caused by the adversarial system. 
*** 
None of these recommendations in isolation will remedy the current situation. 
Stakeholders in the criminal justice system need to confront current deficiencies in 
forensic science from multiple angles, and in a collaborative way.  
 
Part IV: Conclusions 
The case law examined in this article demonstrates that there is significant tension at 
the intersection of law and science in the context of forensic science identification 
evidence. This tension has been generated by the discovery of DNA analysis and 
material criticism of forensic science methodologies. These forms of scientific 
progress have undermined convictions produced by the law’s rational procedures for 
identifying the perpetrators of crimes around the world. The American criminal justice 
system’s response to this uncertainty, however, provides a particularly compelling 
example of the institutional tensions between law and science. 
This article has provided an independent critique of relevant American case law, and 
demonstrated how three themes emerge from the jurisprudence. These themes are 
(1) the law’s misuse of science; (2) law’s scepticism towards change; and (3) law’s 
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narrow construction of rationality, which generates reductionist concepts, and 
divorces science from its social context. As such, this article has demonstrated how 
current judicial approaches to forensic science evidence provide a contemporary 
illustration of key institutional tensions between law and science. To help resolve 
these tensions, the author has suggested a number of reforms. These reforms are 
calling for the law to be more open-minded about change in the light of progressing 
science; the development of forensic science commissions that allow for multi-
stakeholder collaboration to improve the use of forensic science in the criminal 
justice system; increased training for relevant social actors, including lawyers, 
judges, law enforcement and jurors; focused lawyering strategies that seek to 
counter judicial concerns about challenges to forensic science evidence; and a more 
proactive harnessing of the institutional strengths of the courts by judges, when it 
comes to making use of reliable scientific evidence. Collectively, these reforms aim 
to facilitate the criminal justice system to utilize the most scientifically valid and 
reliable forensic science evidence possible, and, thus, improve the efficacy of the 
outcomes it generates. 
The growing number of exonerations in America makes the need for change all the 
more urgent. 224 Error will never be eradicated from social enterprises like law or 
science, but “Pragmatism is preferable to helplessness.”225 The fact that “we can 
build law and science so well should inspire our determination to make them even 
better.”226 As such, the law must start to overcome the “imaginative difficulties” 
associated with being on the cusp of a paradigmatic shift,227 upon which, in the 
context of forensic science identification evidence, the criminal justice system is 
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